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1. Introduction
Even with two scheduled increases in the normal retirement age in 2008 and 2026, the
Social Security Administration projects that the dependency ratio (the ratio of workers
entitled to social security retirement benets to those paying payroll taxes) will more than
double between 1997 and 2050. Figure 11 shows four projected paths of the dependency
ratio, corresponding to alternative eligibility rules: perpetuating the current 65 age quali-
cation, adhering to the two legislated postponements to age 66 in 2008 and to age 67 in
2026, adding two additional postponements beyond those two, or with 11 postponements
{ eventually leaving the retirement eligibility age at 76. The demographic transition will
require scal adjustments to nance our unfunded social security system, with one pos-
sibility being further increases in the normal retirement age. Although the demographic
projections contained in Figure 1 have inspired public discussion of social security reforms,
rarely have they been used in general equilibrium computations designed to inform that
discussion.














Figure 1: Projected dependency ratios.
Besides the issue of nancing our unfunded social security system, the aging pop-
ulation contributes to what, according to the President's Council of Economic Advisors
(1997), is an even larger cause for scal adjustment: it is projected that medicare and
medicaid spending will increase from 2.7% and 1.2% of GDP in 1996 to 8.1% and 4.9% of
GDP in 2050, respectively. This paper uses projected increases in the dependency ratio
(associated with the current legislation), and medicaid and medicare to create a bench
1 In appendix B we describe how we construct this graph.
1mark, and then studies the economic consequences of eight alternative scal adjustment
packages. These packages either (1) throw all of the scal burden onto the labor income tax
rate; (2) raise a consumption tax rate; (3), (4) and (5) reduce benets in various ways while
also adjusting taxes; (6) and (7) increase the linkage of benets to cumulative earnings
while also adjusting either the labor income or consumption tax rate; or (8) implement a
privatization by gradually phasing out benets while adjusting the labor income tax rate.
Except for (8), the experiments abstain from privatization and leave the social security
system unfunded.
In the tradition of Auerbach and Kotliko (1987), we use a general equilibrium
model of overlapping generations of long-lived people. As in _ Imrohoro glu, _ Imrohoro glu, and
Joines (1995), our agents face uncertain life-times and endowments. Huang, _ Imrohoro glu
and Sargent (1997) extended the _ Imrohoro glu, _ Imrohoro glu, and Joines framework to han-
dle the aggregate time-variation occurring during transitions across steady states. We in
turn extend Huang, _ Imrohoro glu and Sargent's (1997) work in four ways: (1) we modify
the technology to incorporate labor-augmenting technical progress; (2) we assume time-
varying survival probabilities and demographic patterns; (3) we change the household's
preferences by activating a life-long bequest motive; (4) we let labor supply choices re-
spond to how retirement benets are related to past earnings. Innovation (1) introduces
the growth rate as a key parameter aecting the eciency of an unfunded retirement
arrangement. Innovation (2) lets us study transitions induced by demographic changes.
Innovation (3) allows us to boost savings above what would be produced by pure life-cycle
households, and thereby helps us calibrate the model to realistic capital{output ratios and
age{savings proles. Innovation (4) not only allows labor supply to respond to policy and
price changes, but also incorporates Auerbach and Kotliko's (1992a, 1992b) and Kot-
liko's (1997) stress on earnings-relatedness as a key parameter governing the distortions
generated by the social security retirement system.
Our main ndings are these:
 In the face of projected demographics, it will be costly to maintain benets at levels
now promised. Large increases in distorting taxes will arrest capital accumulation
and labor supply. Our work indicates that back-of-the-envelope accounting calcu-
lations made outside a general equilibrium model are prone to be overly optimistic.
The Social Security Administration states that a 2.2 percentage point addition to
the 12.4% OASDI payroll tax will restore the nancial balance in the social security
trust fund over the 75 year horizon, given intermediate projections of demographics
and other key variables. According to Goss (1998), Deputy Chief Actuary of the
Social Security Administration, a 4.7% immediate increase of the existing OASDI
payroll tax is necessary to nance the existing social security system in perpetuity.
Injecting the same projections of demographics into our calibrated general equilib-
rium model gives results that diverge from that ocial assessment. We compute
an additional 17.1 percentage points in the payroll tax rate and large welfare losses
associated with maintaining our current unfunded system. The projected increase
in medicaid and medicare payments adds a further 12.7 percentage points to the
2required tax on labor income and increases distortions even more.
 Reducing retirement benets through taxation of benets and consumption or
through postponing the retirement eligibility age results in a signicant reduction
of the scal adjustment required to cope with the aging of the population.
 Policies with similar long-run outcomes can have vastly dierent transient inter-
generational distributional implications. With one exception, all our experiments
impose welfare losses on transitional generations. Policies that partially reduce
retirement benets (by taxing benets, postponing retirement or taxing consump-
tion) or gradually phase them out without compensation yield welfare gains for
future generations but make most of the current generations worse o. The only
experiment that raises the welfare of all current and future cohorts switches from
the current system to a dened contribution system. Evidently, eliminating the
distortion associated with the social security payroll tax by linking benets to con-
tributions is very important, conrming arguments by Kotliko (1998).
A sustainable social security reform seems to require reduced distortions in la-
bor/leisure and consumption/saving choices and some transition policies that compensate
current generations.
Besides the papers we mention above, many others have studied the U.S. social
security system. Among those, the following seem closest to our work. Kotliko, Smetters
and Walliser (1997) use a general equilibrium, long{lived overlapping generations model
to study the consequences of various ways of privatizing the U.S. social security system.
They focus on both inter{generational and intra{generational heterogeneity (the individu-
als belong to dierent exogenous earnings{ability classes) and devote particular attention
to matching current U.S. scal institutions. They incorporate deductions, exemptions,
and progressive benets schedules. Altig, Kotliko, Walliser and Smetters (1997) use the
model of Kotliko, Smetters and Walliser (1997) to study the consequences of dierent tax
reforms. Their model does not incorporate uncertainty. They assume constant population
growth.
Cooley and Soares (1996) study the design and implementation of a pay{as{you{go
social insurance system as a problem in political economy. They are particularly interested
about the sustainability of such a system in a world with stochastic population growth.
They consider a model with four period{lived agents, no lifespan uncertainty, and exoge-
nous labor supply. They calibrate their population shares up to 1995. They do not study
the substantial aging of the population after that date.
32. The model
The model economy consists of overlapping generations of individuals who live no longer
than T + 1 years, and an innitely lived government. During the rst tR + 1 periods of
life, a consumer supplies labor in exchange for wages that she allocates among consump-
tion, taxes, and asset accumulation. During the nal T − tR periods of life, the consumer
receives social security benets. In addition to life span risk, agents face dierent income
shocks that they cannot insure. They can smooth consumption by accumulating two risk{
free assets: physical capital and government bonds. The government taxes consumption
and income from capital and labor, issues and services debt, purchases goods, and pays
retirement benets. There is a constant returns to scale Cobb{Douglas aggregate produc-
tion function, constant labor-augmenting technical progress, and no aggregate uncertainty.
Equilibrium factor prices are time{varying but deterministic.
Cast of characters
For easy reference, we summarize our notation in Table 1. For any variable z,a
subscript t denotes age, and an argument s in parentheses denotes calendar time. There is
an exogenous gross rate >1 of labor-augmenting technical progress. We let t(s)=ts
be an exogenous time-dependent age{eciency index. The number of people of age t at
time s is Nt(s); the total population alive at time s is N(s)=
PT
t=0 Nt(s); kt(s − 1)s−1
is physical capital held by an age-t person at the end of time s − 1; K(s − 1)s−1 = PT
t=0 kt(s − 1)s−1Nt(s − 1) is total physical capital at the end of period s − 1. Where 
is the physical rate of depreciation of capital, we let R(s−1) = 1+r(s−1)− be the rate
of return on asset holding; r(s − 1) is the gross-of-depreciation rate of return on physical
capital from time s − 1t ot i m es; g(s)s is per capita government purchases of goods at
time s; w(s) is a base wage rate at time s; ct(s)s and `t(s) are consumption and labor
supply at time s for someone of age t; t(s)s denotes total tax payments, St(s)s social
security payments, and et(s)s the cumulative labor earnings of a household of age t at
time s.W el e tat−1(s−1)s−1 be a consumer's asset holdings at the beginning of age t at
time s; dt is a random component of a household's endowment, described by dt = Ud;tzt,
where zt is an exogenous rst-order vector stochastic process used to model the ﬂow of
information, and Ud;t is an age-dependent selection vector.
Factor prices
We assume a constant returns Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function with
labor and capital arguments s PtR
t=0 t `t(s)Nt(s)a n dK(s−1)s−1, respectively. From the
rm's problem in a competitive equilibrium, the rentals r(s − 1) and w(s) are determined
from marginal productivity conditions:2
r (s − 1) = r






K (s − 1)
L(s)
~ −1
2 The presence of  in the denominator is due to our timing convention.
4Demography Government
Nt(s) population, age t time sg (s)s gov't purchases
t(s) one-period survival probability a(s) tax rate on assets
t(s) survival prob to age t `(s) labor tax rate
ft(s) fraction of age t people b(s) tax rate on bequests
T +1 ;t R + 1 max life-span, work life-span
Household Production and Information
ct(s)s consumption at age tw (s) wage
`t(s) labor at age t t(s) age-eciency index
at(s)s asset holdings at age tr (s)r a t e o f r e t u r n
bt(s)s bonds at age tK (s)s aggregate physical capital
kt(s)s physical capital at tL (s) aggregate labor
et(s)s cumulative labor earnings zt information
St(s)s retirement benets dt endowment shock
t(s)s total tax payments xt household state vector
Beq(s)s aggregate bequests
Table 1: Cast of Characters.
w(s)=w

K (s − 1)
L(s)

=( 1− ~ )A






t=0 t `t(s)Nt(s). The wage of an age-t worker at time s is tsw(s).
~  2 (0;1) is the income share of capital and A is total factor productivity.
Economy{wide physical resource constraint
Using the rm's rst order conditions and constant returns to scale, we can write the




ct (s)Nt (s)+K (s)=
R(s − 1)

K (s − 1) + w(s)
tR X
t=0
t `t (s) Nt (s):
Demographics
At date s, a cohort of workers of measure N0(s) arrives. The luckiest live during
s;s +1 ;::::;s + T + 1, but many die before age T + 1. As a cohort ages, mortality is
described by t(s), the conditional probability of surviving from age t to age t+1 at time
s. Let Nt(s) be the number of age t people alive at time s. It moves according to
Nt+1 (s +1 )=t (s) Nt (s): (1)
Iterating on (1) gives
Nt (s)=t−1 (s − 1) t−2 (s − 2)0 (s − t) N0 (s − t): (2)




t−h (s − h): (3)
We assume a path n(s) of the rate of growth of new workers, so that N0(s)=n(s)N0(s−1),
which implies N0(s)=
Qs
h=1 n(h)N0(0). Let (s)=
Qs
h=1 n(h). Then the fraction ft(s)




i=0 i (s) (s − i)
: (4)





We take the paths n(s)a n dt(s)f o rs = 1970;:::;2060 + 3T as parameters.
The people that enter the model at t = 0 are 21 years old workers. New retirees are
65 years old and agents can live up to age 90.
Households
We assume the one-period utility function for an age t person
u(ct (s);` t (s)) = −1=2
h
(ct (s) − γ)
2 +( 2`t (s))
2
i
6where 2 and γ are preference parameters. Conditional on being alive, the household
discounts future utilities by a constant .
We adopt `warm glow' altruism, which was rst introduced by Andreoni (1989,
1990). It asserts that the agent derives utility from leaving a bequest, independently of
the prospective consumption stream of the beneciary. We adopt this formulation mainly
for computational manageability. In our setup, agents are long{lived and face a large
state-space. We compute long transitions. Considering a model in which one agent's utility
depends on the other agent's state variables would substantially increase the computational
burden. However, Andreoni (1989, 1990) argues that there is empirical evidence against
`pure altruism models' that make the consumptions of parent and heir independent of the
distribution of income among them (Barro, 1974). Becker (1974) suggests that `warm{
glow' preferences may arise because perhaps people have a taste for giving: they receive
status or acclaim, or simply experience utility from having done their bit.
We use this device not only to get more capital accumulation than in a pure life{cycle
model (see Jones and Manuelli, 1992 for a discussion of the diculties in matching capital
accumulation in a pure life{cycle model), but also to reconcile our model with Kotliko and
Summers' (1981) computations, according to which intergenerational transfers account for
70{130% of the current value of the U.S. capital stock. The fact that we do not allow for
inter{vivos transfers in our model is not a restrictive assumption: since we do not have
borrowing constraints, the timing of bequests or inter{vivos transfers is not relevant.
Let the state of an age t person at the start of time s be denoted xt(s)=
[at−1(s − 1);e t−1(s − 1);z0
t ]
0. We formulate preferences recursively. We impute to an
age t − 1 person a particular type of bequest motive via a `terminal value' function
Vt(xt(s)j dead at t)=VT+1(xt(s)) = xt(s)0PT+1xt(s), where PT+1 is a negative semi-
denite matrix with parameters that determine the bequest motive.3 Our formulation
gradually activates the bequest motive, intensifying it with age as the mortality table
makes the household think more about the hereafter. For t =0 ;:::;T,l e tVt(xt(s)) be the
optimal value function for an age t person. The household's Bellman equations are




u(ct (s);` t (s)) +  t (s)E [Vt+1 (at (s);e t (s);z t+1)jJt (s)]




where Jt(s) is the information set of an age-t agent at time s and the maximization is




at−1 (s − 1) + w(s) t `t (s)+St (s) − t (s)+dt (6)
t (s)=` (s)[ w(s) t `t (s)+dt]







at−1 (s − 1) + c (s) ct (s)( 7 )
et (s)=

et−1 (s − 1) + w(s) t `t (s)f o r t  tR +1




0f o r t  tR +1
fixbent (s)+rratet (s)  −1  et−1 (s − 1) for t>t R +1 (9)











The right side of (6) is the household's after-tax income, the sum of wages, earnings on
assets, a possibly serially correlated idiosyncratic mean-zero endowment shock dt, retire-
ment benets (if any), minus tax payments. Equation (7) decomposes total tax payments
t into taxes on labor income, assets, and consumption. Equation (8) updates et(s), the
cumulated, wage{indexed, labor earnings of the household that, depending on the pa-
rameter rrate in (9), aects the household's eventual entitlement to retirement benets.
The worker's past contributions are indexed to wage productivity growth; the pension she
receives during retirement is not; as in the U.S. Social Security System.
Formula (9) tells how retirement benets are related to past earnings. Part of
social security payments (fixbent(s)) is independent of past earnings, and part (rratet(s)
et−1(s)) responds to past earnings.
We compute fixben as follows. For people living within a steady state,
fixbent (s)=tR+1−t  fixrate AV (s); (12)






t `t (s) w(s): (13)
To mimic current U.S. benets, equation (12) computes average earnings to account for
changes in the average wages since the year the earnings were received; but once a worker
retires, her pension is no longer indexed to productivity growth.
For people living during the transition, we make fixbena linear combination of the
contribution in the initial steady state and that in the nal steady state. This simplies
the computations.
Bequests are distributed only to newborn workers: each agent born at time s begins
life with assets s−1a−1(s − 1), which we set equal to a per capita share of total bequests
from people who died at the end of period s − 1. This distribution scheme implies that
within a steady state, per capita initial assets equal per capita bequests adjusted for popu-
lation and productivity growth. However, during either policy or demographic transitions
8between steady states, this distribution scheme implies that what a generation receives in
bequests no longer equals what it leaves behind.
In (10), ~ wt+1 is a martingale dierence process, relative to the history of z's up
to age t, driving the information ﬂow zt,a n dUγ;U dt are selector vectors determining
the preference shock process γt and the endowment shock process dt. In the experiments
reported in this paper, we set the preference shock to a constant but specify dt to be
random process with mean zero: dt =  dt−1+~ w1t, with   = :8. The martingale dierence
sequence ~ wt+1 is adapted to Jt =(~ wt
0;x 0), with E(~ wt+1jJt)=0 ,E(~ wt+1 ~ w0
t+1jJt)=I.
Aggregates and distributions across people
In addition to life span risk, individuals face dierent sequences of random labor
income shocks, which they cannot insure. People smooth consumption across time and
labor income states only by accumulating two risk-free assets { physical capital and gov-
ernment bonds; they use these together with social security retirement benets to provide
for old-age consumption.
Let Dt(s)=[ ct(s) `t(s) at(s)]
0 be the vector of decisions made by an age t
worker at time s. Our specication makes Dt(s) a linear time-and-age dependent function
of xt(s)
Dt (s)=Lt (s)xt (s);
and makes the state vector follow the linear law of motion xt+1(s +1 )=At(s)xt(s)+
Ct(s)wt+1. Our model imposes restrictions on the matrices Lt(s);A t(s)a n dCt(s). Individ-
uals have rational expectations, and make Lt(s);A t(s)a n dCt(s) depend on the sequence
of prices and government scal policies over their potential life-span s;s+1;:::;s+T +1.
We can compute probability distributions across workers for the state and decision
vectors. Let t(s)=Ext(s);t(s)=E(xt(s) − t(s))(xt(s) − t(s))0. Given a mean and




, the moments follow the
laws of motion t+1(s+1)=At(s)t(s)a n d t+1(s+1)=At(s)t(s)At(s)0+Ct(s)Ct(s)0.
Aggregate quantities of interest such as aggregate per capita consumption and ag-
gregate per capita physical capital can be easily computed by obtaining weighted averages
of features of the distributions of quantities across individuals alive at a point in time.
Aggregate quantities are deterministic functions of time because all randomness averages
out across a large number of individuals. Only these aggregate quantities appear in the
government budget constraint and the model's market clearing conditions.
The government
An age-t person divides his time s asset holdings at(s) between government bonds
and private capital: at(s)=bt(s)+kt(s), where bt(s) is government debt. The government's




























at−1 (s − 1)+







(1 − t (s))at (s − 1) Nt (s − 1) (15)
and
a−1 (s − 1) =
Beq(s)  (1 − b)
N0 (s)
: (16)
The amount a−1(s−1) of assets is inherited by each new worker at time s. We assume that
in administering the bequest tax, the government acquires capital and government bonds
in the same proportions that they are held in the aggregate portfolio. Consistent with this
specication, the per new worker inheritance a−1(s−1) is divided between physical capital
and government bonds as follows:
k−1 (s − 1) =
PT
t=0 (1 − t (s)) kt (s − 1) Nt (s − 1)
N0 (s)
b−1 (s − 1) =
PT





A =2 ~  = :33 ftg Hansen (1993)  = .055
 =1 :016
Household:
γ =1 1 2 = −1:7  = :994 JG= :032
JB =6 0 PT see text dt see text
Demography:
n(s) assumed path t(s) from life tables T =6 9 tR =4 3
Table 2: Parameters.
The algorithm
We rst compute the initial steady state. We use backward induction to compute an
agent's value functions and policy functions, taking as given government policy, bequests
and prices. We then iterate until convergence on:
(i) the social security benets, to match the desired replacement rate;
(ii) bequests, so that planned bequests coincide with received ones;
(iii) the labor income or consumption tax to satisfy the government budget constraint;
(iv) factor prices, to match the rms' rst order conditions.
To compute the nal steady state we use the same procedure described for the initial
steady state, plus we iterate on the government debt level to match the debt to GDP ratio
we have in the initial steady state. In the initial steady state the debt to gdp ratio was
calibrated, in the second steady state we x it.
Lastly, we compute the transition dynamics by solving backward the sequence of
value functions and policy functions, taking as given the time{varying transition policies,
prices and bequests. We iterate until convergence on:
(i) a parameterized path for the tax rate to match the nal debt to GDP ratio;
(ii) factor prices.
Prices are allowed to adjust for a phase{out period after the changes in the demographics
and policies have ended. Though the model economy would converge to a new steady state
11only asymptotically (because prices are endogenous) we `truncate' this process and impose
convergence in 2T periods.
Calibrated Transition Demographics
We calibrate and compute an initial steady state, associated with constant pre-1975 values
of the demographic parameters t;n. We then take time-varying t(s);n(s) parameters






t if s  1974;




t = t(1970) from the mortality table and 1
t = t(2060 + t), the SSA numbers
for the cohort to be born in 2060; the ^ t(s) are taken from the SSA.4 We calibrated the
growth rate n(s) to match SSA's forecasts of the dependency ratio. According to the SSA,
the dependency ratio was about 18% in 1974 and will increase to about 50% in 2060. The
population of new workers continues to grow at its initial steady state value of 1.3% until
1984. After 1984, we gradually diminish n(s) to .8% per year so that the dependency ratio
becomes roughly 50% in 2060, and then stabilizes. Our calculations begin by assuming
that prior to 1975, the economy was in a steady state and that people behaved as if they
expected their survival probabilities to be those experienced by people alive in 1970; but
in 1975, people suddenly realize that the survival probability tables are changing over time
and switch to using the `correct' ones. After the conditional survival probabilities attain a
steady state in 2060, the demographic structure changes for another T + 1 years, until it
reaches a new steady state in 2060+(T +1). The departure of the demographic parameters
t(s);n(s) from their values at the initial steady state requires scal adjustments.
Initial Steady State
All of our experiments start from a common initial steady state. We set T =6 9 ;t R =
43. Since our age 0 people work immediately, we think of them as twenty one year olds, of
new-retirees as 65 year olds, and of age T + 1 workers as 90 year olds. We calibrated the
parameters A;γt;; 2;J G
5, JB so that in this initial steady state the capital-GDP ratio is
3.0, the government purchases to GDP ratio is .21, the debt to GDP ratio is .46, and the
mean age-consumption prole resembles the observed data. For the initial steady state,
we set the tax rate on income from capital to be 30%, the tax rate on bequests at 10%,
and the tax rate on consumption at 5.5%. Given government purchases, steady state debt,
and these tax rates, the steady-state equilibrium tax rate on labor income turns out to be
29.7%. In the initial steady state, the interest rate is 5:9% and the marginal productivity
of labor (w) is 3.2. Each new worker receives a bequest worth about 52% of the average
per capita capital in the economy. Throughout the paper, the rate of technical progress is
kept constant at its initial steady state level of  =1 :016.
4 The life tables are taken from Bell, Wade and Goss (1992). See Appendix B for a brief discussion
of how these projections are calculated.
5 In appendix C we perform some sensitivity analysis on JG.
12Alternative Fiscal Responses
We computed eight equilibrium transition paths associated with alternative govern-
ment responses to the demographic parameters t(s);n(s);s= 1975;:::;2060. In addition
to the change in these demographic variables, there are two changes that are common to
all eight computations. First, to reﬂect projected increases in medicare and medicaid, we
gradually increase government purchases so that they eventually become 25% higher than
their initial steady state level. Second, current legislation on the postponement of the
retirement age is implemented, raising the mandatory retirement age by one year in 2008,
and by another year in 2026, for the cohort that qualies for retirement then.
We name the computations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. For easy reference, they are
summarized in table 3. In computations 1 and 2, social security benets are kept at their
levels in the rst steady state (i.e., the benet rate parameters fixben is left intact); the
entire burden of adjusting to the demographic changes is absorbed by scheduled increases
in the tax on labor income alone (in experiment 1) or in the tax on consumption alone
(in computation 2). Computations 3 and 4 impose reductions on benets in the form of
announced increases of tR+2, the mandatory retirement age, by two additional years, one
in 2032 and the other one in 2036, to eventually raise it to 69. The remaining burden of
adjustment is absorbed by scheduled increases in the labor income tax rate (experiment
3) or the consumption tax rate (experiment 4). Computation 5 also imposes a reduction
in benets, not by increasing retirement age, but by exposing all social security retirement
benets fully to the labor income tax rate `; it schedules increases in the labor income
tax rate to complete the scal adjustments. Computations 6 and 7 schedule adjustments
in the formula for benets, fully linking them to past earnings for people retiring in year
2000 or later. Thus, while in the rst ve experiments and experiment 8 rrate =0a n d
fixrate= :6, in experiment 6 and 7 , rrate = :6
tR+1;fixrate= 0 for people retiring in year
2000 and after.6 In experiment 6, the labor income tax is raised to pick up the residual
tax burden, while in experiment 7, the consumption tax is increased. Finally, computation
8 is an uncompensated phase out of the current system, in which benets are phased out
to zero over a 50{year horizon, starting in the year 2000.
Government tax policy during transitions
In steps, the government increases one tax rate (either ` or c) during a transition,
leaving all other tax rates constant. These tax changes are scheduled and announced as
follows. In 1975 the government announces that starting in year 2000, it will increase the
tax on labor income (in experiments 1, 3, 5, 6 and 8) or on consumption (in experiments 2,
4 and 7) every ten years in order to reach the terminal steady state with the desired debt
to GDP ratio. Starting in 2060, that tax rate is held constant at its new steady state level,
but the wage rate and interest rate continue to vary for another 2(T + 1) periods, after
which time we x them evermore. We then enter a new phase of T + 1 periods, during
6 We also run a modied version of this `linkage' experiment in which the formula for cumulated
earnings includes the agent's income shock. This is done to explore the importance of insurance against
income shocks implied in our previous formulation.
13Experiment Benets Tax Adjustment
1 benchmark:
postpone in 2008, 2026 gradually raise `(s)
2 benchmark gradually raise c(s)
3 also postpone in 2032, 2038 gradually raise `(s)
4 also postpone in 2032, 2038 gradually raise c(s)
5 tax benets gradually raise `(s)
6 link benets to earnings gradually raise `(s)
7 link benets to earnings gradually raise c(s)
8 gradual privatization gradually raise `(s)
Table 3: Eight Experiments.
which the wage rate and interest rate are pegged at their terminal steady state values. As
cohorts born during the transition period die, new ones are born into the terminal steady
state.
14Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Variable
` 29.7% " 59.5% 29.7% " 52.9% 29.7% " 42.8% " 51.3% 29:7% # 26:0%
c 5.5% " 36.9% 5.5% " 31.2% 5.5% 5.5% " 30:5% 5:5%
interest rate 5.9% # 5.0% # 4.1% # 4.9% # 4.2% # 4.2% # 4.9% # 4:2% # 3:0%
wage +4:2% +8:8% +4:8% +8:5% +8:2% +4:6% +8:5% +15:2%
GDP −17:4% −4:6% −10:7% −2:25% −3:4% −2:4% +3:7% +8:7%
mean asset holdings −12:5% +9:2% −4:4% +11:4% +9:4% +4:0% +18:1% +38:0%
mean capital −11:7% +11:3% −3:4% +13:5% +11:3% +5:0% +20:3% +42:5%
mean consumption −28:4% −13:4% −19:1% −9:8% −11:1% −7:0% −1:4% −0:2%
mean e. labor −20:8% −12:4% −14:8% −10:0% −10:6% −6:6% −4:4% −5:6%
bequests +35% +105% +57% +108% +64% +100% +137% +63%
K/GDP 3.0 " 3.2 " 3.5 " 3.2 " 3.4 " 3.4 " 3.2 " 3:4 " 3:9
G/G D P 2 0 :6% " 31:2% " 27:1% " 28:9% " 26:4% " 26:7% " 26:4% " 24:9% " 23:7%
Table 4: Alterations of Steady States in Eight Experiments.
Numerical Results
Table 4 compares outcomes across steady states for the eight experiments. Comparing the
steady states we only see the positive aspects of taxing or reducing pensions and increasing
savings (the savings and capital increase is also linked to the increased life{span). When
we do welfare comparisons, it will become evident that the various policies aect dierently
members of dierent generations in the transition.
Table 4 refers to variables that are normalized by the exogenous productivity
growth. Therefore, in column 1 for example, GDP −17:4% mean that in the nal steady
state for experiment 1, GDP is 17.4% lower than it would have been, should the economy
have grown at the constant, exogenous, productivity growth rate. This is the convention
that we have in mind when discussing the results.
We can summarize our main results as follows:
 When the government uses the labor income tax rate to nance the scal burden
(Experiment 1), the tax rate goes from 29.7% to eventually 59.5%, the labor supply
falls by 20.8%, the capital stock decreases by 11.7% and output falls by 17.4%.7
7 For the initial steady state, we computed a `long run' labor elasticity associated with our calibrated
15The decline in the aggregate labor input owes much to the projected demographics
and the increased distortionary taxation of labor income. Experiment 6 involves a
similar computation except that now retirement benets are linked to past earnings
which removes a distortion in the leisure/labor choice as far as the social security
contributions are concerned. However, these contributions deliver a rate of return
equal to the growth rate of output in the economy, which is less than the return
on private capital. Overall, the results from Experiment 6 are far better than those
in Experiment 1. ` rises to 51.3%, the labor input falls only by 6.6%, the capital
stock rises by 5.0%, and GDP decreases by only 2.4%.
 When the government uses the consumption tax to nance the scal burden created
by the retirement of the baby boom generation (Experiment 2), the consumption
tax rate rises from 5.5% in the initial steady-state to 36.9% in the nal steady-state.
Aggregate labor input falls by 12.4%, capital rises by 11.3% and GDP falls by 4.6%.
Experiment 7 links the retirement benets to the agent's past average earnings (as
in Experiment 6), and uses the consumption tax increase to nance government
expenses. With the linkage of benets and contributions and the use of the con-
sumption tax, the labor supply distortion is the smallest among all experiments.
The tax rate on consumption raises to 29.7%; GDP and mean capital raise 3.7%,
20.3% respectively, and consumption decreases by 1.4%. Aggregate labor input falls
by 4.4%.
 Taxing benets at the labor income tax rate and using a higher labor income tax
rate to nance the residual burden (Experiment 5) delivers results that are similar
to those of the second experiment in many respects, since taxing benets is like
taxing the consumption of the old. For example, aggregate labor input falls by
10.6%, capital rises by 11.3% and GDP falls by 3.4%.
 Postponing the retirement age by two additional years, to age 69, and then using
either ` (Experiment 3) or c (Experiment 4) to nance the remaining burden sig-
nicantly reduces the size of the scal burden and therefore the size of the additional
tax required to nance it. When the labor income tax is used, it rises to 52.9% in
the nal steady-state compared to the 59.5% in Experiment 1. Aggregate labor
input falls only by 14.8% (20.8% in Experiment 1), capital stock falls by 3.4% and
GDP falls by 10.7%. When the consumption tax is used, it rises to 30.5% compared
with the 36.9% in Experiment 2; labor supply falls by 4.4%, capital stock rises by
20.3% and GDP increases by 3.7%.
 When we compare Experiments 3-5 to Experiment 1, it should be noted that the key
dierence in the former is the reduction in social security benets through using
parameters as follows. We xed all policy parameters at their initial steady state values, and increased
the real wage while leaving the interest rate and level of retirement benets xed. We computed the
new labor-supply, then averaged the age-specic labor supply by cohort percentages, to get an average
percentage life-time response in labor supply. This calculation yielded a 1.36% decrease of the agent's
lifetime labor supply in response to a 10% wage increase, indicating the income-eect's domination of the
substitution eect for our calibration.
16the consumption tax instead of the labor income tax, postponing the retirement
age, or taxing social security benets. All three alternative scal policies yield a
higher work eort, higher consumption and larger saving and capital, relative to
the Experiment 1 policy of using the labor income tax to nance the scal burden.
As a result, the economy achieves a softer landing to a nal steady-state after the
demographic transition.
 The gradual (and uncompensated) phase-out of the unfunded social security system
(Experiment 8) delivers a nal steady state in which consumers can only invest in
capital or government debt to provide for retirement. This yields a substantial
increase of 38% of mean asset holding and and raise of 42.5% for capital. As a
result the interest rate decreases from 5.9% to 3.0%. The labor supply falls by 5.6%,
wage increases by 15.2% and the labor income tax rate falls to 26%. Consumption
decreases by 0.2% and GDP rises by 8.73%.
Steady-state proles
The discipline of using an applied general equilibrium model manifests itself by
generating several forces that act on individuals' choices over the life cycle and along
the transition to a nal steady-state. There are income and intertemporal substitution
eects from changes in the real interest rate; there are incentive eects stemming from
changes in tax rates, reductions in benets and retirement age postponements; and there
are demographic changes prompting individuals to save more (for both precautionary and
life cycle reasons) as they face an increased life expectancy. In our discussion of steady-
state proles below, we will highlight those factors that we think are most responsible for
the outcomes.
Age-Labor Supply Proles
Figures 3 and 4 show the age-labor supply prole in our experiments (the graphs
depict both the cross-section and the life{cycle proles in the steady state: labor eciency
increases exogenously as a result of the technological progress, but labor supply does not).
The prole labeled `0' belongs to the initial steady-state. Labor supply rises with age,
peaks around age 40, then falls and drops to zero at the mandatory retirement age of 65.
Experiments 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 have the same mandatory retirement age of 67. Experiments
3 and 4 postpone retirement to age 69. Apart from this dierence, all experiments tilt
the age-labor supply prole in the nal steady-state in the counterclockwise direction.
Although there are several forces at work, two in particular seem to be responsible for
the reallocation of work eort over the life cycle. First, the real interest rate in all of the
nal steady-states is lower than that in the initial steady-state. Second, the postponement
of retirement by at least two years provides an incentive to postpone work eort since
eciency in these `later' years is still higher than eciency in the `very young years'.
Age-Wealth Proles
Figures 5 and 6 display the cross{section age asset{holding proles: individuals in
all the nal steady-states inherit higher wealth and decumulate faster early on in the life
cycle. In some of the experiments (2, 4, 5, 7), they accumulate wealth for a longer period of
17time or decumulate slower later in the life{cycle (1, 3, 6), and leave larger bequests. This
behavior is consistent with a lower real interest rate in the nal steady-states combined
with an increase in the incentive to save brought on by the increase in life expectancy
and/or a reduction in benets.
In the nal steady state of experiment 8, the government no longer provides social
security payments (nor taxes to nance them) and consumers lose the life{span insurance
provided by pensions, which are paid as long as they live. Private saving becomes the only
source of consumption during retirement. In this world, consumers between age 50 and 67
save much more than in the other experiments and capital accumulation is much larger.
After retirement, they run down their assets much faster to consume. Since there are no
annuities markets in the model, asset accumulation also serves the purpose of self{insuring
against life{span risk. Should the consumer live long enough, she will run down most of
her assets and leave almost no bequest: her heirs will share the \longevity risk".
Age-Consumption Proles
Figures 7 and 8 plot the cross-section consumption prole. In the initial steady state
consumption declines rather steeply for people past retirement age. This happens because
older people retired in periods during which the technological progress was lower and social
security benets are not productivity{indexed after retirement. Therefore retired, older
consumers, tend to be poorer than retired younger ones and can consume less.
The cross{section age-consumption proles in the nal steady-states of experiments
1{7 are ﬂatter than the one in the initial steady-state. The decline in the real interest
rate, and the enhanced desire to save due to the aging of the population are powerful
forces in shaping these proles. In experiment 8 an even lower interest rate, the necessity
of nancing retirement consumption out of accumulated assets and the wealth eect we
discussed above, combine with an increased life{expectancy to produce an even sharper
decline for cross{sectional consumption past retirement age
Figures 9 and 10 depict the life{cycle consumption prole: consumption over time
from the point of view of an individual born in the initial or nal steady state, with
exogenous technological progress increasing the worker's productivity.
Transition Paths
Figures 11 and 12 show the time path of labor income and consumption tax rates.
As described in the previous section, the government is required to announce and raise the
appropriate tax rate is ve steps, each lasting for ten years, and keep them unchanged at
the new steady state levels. Note that in experiment 8 where social security is gradually
phased out the labor income tax rate needs eventually to fall for the government to maintain
the target debt to GDP ratio.
The structure of preferences and our calibration combine to produce consumers who
do not mind substituting intertemporally consumption and leisure: in Figures 15{18 we
can see how average consumption or average labor supply are not smooth over time.
Figures 17 and 18 show the time path of aggregate labor along the transition in our
experiments. For example, in experiment 1, the ve sharp drops of aggregate labor coincide
with the implementation of the announced increases in the labor income tax rate. The
18two spikes that are smaller in size correspond to the scheduled increases in the mandatory
retirement age (years 2008 and 2026 for all experiments, plus years 2032 and 2038 for
experiments 3 and 4 only). Aggregate labor input declines much less under experiments
6 and 7 because labor income taxation is now less distortionary because of the linkage
between benets and contributions.
Figures 19 and 20 show the time path of aggregate capital. In experiment 8, where
social security is gradually phased out, the capital stock rises near-monotonically to a much
larger value than in all of the other experiments.
Welfare implications
In this subsection we report our ndings on the intergenerational redistribution
of welfare. Figure 2 uses the value function of people in experiment 1 as a base from
which to evaluate the other seven experiments. It measures one-time awards of assets to
those people already working or retired in 1975 (the date that the transition from the
initial demographics begins) and to those new workers arriving after 1975. The awards
are designed to make people as well o under the policy parameters of experiment 1
(with compensation) as they would be under the parameters of experiment j (without the
compensation). The awards are made as follows. To people already working or retired
in 1975, we use the appropriate age-indexed value function of a person born in the year
indicated, evaluate it at the mean assets of a surviving person of the relevant age, and
express the award of assets as a ratio to the mean assets owed by people of that age at
birth. To people entering the work force after 1975, we use the value function of a new
entrant, and express the award as a ratio of the assets inherited by a new entrant at
that date. Thus, a positive number indicates that a positive award would be needed to
compensate a person of the indicated birthdate living in experiment 1 to leave him/her as
well o as in experiment j. The gure reveals the dierent interests served by the dierent
transition measures. For example, consider an average member of the cohort born in
1940. This individual would rather give up some wealth and stay under the Experiment 1
scal policy of rising labor income taxation than accept the Experiment 5 policy of taxing
benets.
Essentially all future generations are better o under Experiments 2{8 relative to
Experiment 1. In fact, when we compute an overall welfare measure by properly taking
into account the welfare gains and losses of all generations, weighing them by their (time-
varying) population shares and discounting the future gains and losses by the after{tax
real interest rate, all of the experiments deliver a welfare gain. Experiment 2 produces a
welfare improvement of 54% of GDP (at the initial steady-state) relative to Experiment
1. Experiments 3, 4, 5, yield overall welfare gains of 49%, 84% and 56% respectively.
Experiments 6, 7 and 8 produce an overall welfare gain of 197%, 189% and 10.9% of GDP,
respectively, relative to Experiment 1.
Despite the fact that dierent scal policies have similar long-run and overall welfare
consequences, existing generations fare quite dierently under these policies. The only
scal policy that benets the existing generations in addition to future generations is the
policy of switching from the current dened benet system to a dened contribution system



















Figure 2: Compensation in terms of fraction of assets to be given to a person born in year
t living under experiment 1 to make her indierent between experiment j and experiment
1.
and using a higher labor income tax rate to nance the residual scal burden (experiment
6). When a link is established between what an agent contributes to the system and what
the agent eventually receives as benets, much of the labor income tax no longer distorts
labor supply decisions. Evidently, this particular reform of the (still) unfunded system
goes a long way to produce economic benets even for the generations that are currently
alive. The experiment 3 policy of postponing retirement for two additional years and using
the labor income tax to nance the remaining burden seems to benet almost all of the
existing generations; only the youngest generations, those that are 21 years old between
1970 and 1980, appear to experience small welfare costs under this policy. In general,
the use of a higher consumption tax hurts existing generations, as experiments 2, 4 and
7 indicate. The magnitude of the welfare cost on the existing generations also depends
on other components of the scal package. For example, use of a higher consumption
tax and introducing a linkage of benets to contributions yield a smaller welfare cost
for the existing generations compared to those produced by experiments 2 and 4. The
largest welfare costs on the existing generations are generated under experiments 5 and
208. Experiment 5 makes retirement benets taxable and uses a higher labor income tax
rate to nance the residual scal burden. This policy simultaneously worsens the labor
supply distortion and imposes a large cost on the retirees. A gradual and uncompensated
privatization of the social security system makes all existing generations worse o relative
to maintaining the unfunded system and relying on a higher labor income tax rate to
provide for larger aggregate benets.
These ndings point to the importance of compensation schemes that will cush-
ion the transition to a funded system and underline the signicance of the distortionary
taxation inherent in a dened contribution system.
Comparing a labor income tax versus a consumption tax (experiment 1 vs. 2 and 3
vs. 4), we see that the consumption tax signicantly reduces distortions. This is partly due
to the well known public nance result that switching to a consumption tax is equivalent to
taxing the initial capital. In our setup, this also derives from the fact that a consumption
tax is also a tax on social security benets, which are lump{sum, and hence acts as a lump{
sum tax on retirees. The consumption tax has also important redistributional aspects
because a labor tax hits only the workers while the consumption tax hits both workers and
retired agents.
As we have seen comparing the steady states of experiments 1 vs. 2, the drop in
GDP in experiment 2 is much less pronounced and savings, capital and consumption are
much higher. This is linked to several forces: the lump sum component in the consumption
tax, a smaller labor/leisure distortion (the labor tax rate is lower in experiment 2) and
the fact that since the consumption tax reduces pensions, people save more for retirement.
The resulting eect is that the interest rate decreases and real wage increases. Figure 2
shows that people born between 1920 and 1980 are those who lose in experiment 2: they
are hit by the consumption tax while not beneting from the reduction in the burden
of pensions. As time passes, the second eect becomes stronger than the rst one. In
particular baby{boomers (born in 1947{1960) are those who lose a lot in experiment 2:
they retire when the consumption tax starts to hit. They worked and paid to nance the
social security system and, when they retire, they pay additional taxes on consumption.
Postponing the retirement age also reduces distortions, allowing people to work an
additional two periods. Comparing experiment 1 vs. experiment 3 we see that while labor
increases because people work longer, savings increase even more because agents have to
work for two more years in a region where their eciency is quite low, and this could be a
negative shock to their income in that period. The eect on savings is much smaller than
the one we get with a consumption tax. Postponing the mandatory retirement age seems
to leave most generations unhurt or better o relative to experiment 1. As benets are
reduced there is less taxation and this osets the welfare loss associated with having to work
two extra years until retirement. This explains why experiment 4 dominates experiment 2,
and experiment 3 nearly-dominates experiment 1. Experiments 2 and 4 roughly generate
the same winners and losers.
Taxing social security benets at the same rate as labor income (experiment 5) is a
way of reducing benets and making the retirees to share the burden of an increased labor
21tax with the workers. Excluding privatization, experiment 5 is the policy that redistributes
more across generations: it hits old people alive in year 2000 (older than baby{boomers)
hard, but asymptotically it is similar to experiments 2, where the consumption tax is
raised. Again, this nding highlights the similarities in the economic incentives generated
by reducing benets through retirement age postponement, taxing benets at the labor
income tax rate, and taxing consumption.
Privatization through a gradual, uncompensated phase-out is the most welfare en-
hancing policy in the long run. However, the transitional cohorts stand to suer a great
deal in the absence of any intertemporal redistribution of benets and losses.8 This policy
especially hurts the younger baby-boomers and the children of the older baby-boomers.
These transitional generations not only see their benets phased out, but they share in the
burden of nancing the retirement of a succession of larger than before cohorts.
One policy which is unambiguously benecial to all generations and one with a
sizable welfare gain for the future generations is a switch from the current system to a
dened contribution system, namely experiment 6. Figure 2 reveals that even the transi-
tional generations are quite better o under experiment 6 relative to going along with the
transition path under experiment 1. Evidently the reduction of the distortion in the labor
income tax is economically quite important. 9
8 This is one of the points raised by Huang, _ Imrohoro glu and Sargent (1997).
9 In our computation of cumulated earnings which dene contributions and determine benets, we
left out the individual's idiosyncratic income shock. As a sensitivity check, we computed an alternative
experiment 6 transition in which we included the income shock in the formula for cumulated earnings.
Note that this eliminates the insurance aspect implied by our previous formulation. We found that the
policy functions of the agents and the aggregates of the economy were the same but the agents' welfare
was slightly lower with respect to the `linkage with insurance against income risk'. The eect on welfare
was smaller than 1%.
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Variable
` 29.7% "59.5% "38.5% "46.8%
interest rate 5.9% # 5.0% 0% # 4.7%
wage +4.2% 0% +5.8%
GDP −17:4% +17.4% −11:0%
mean asset holdings −12:5% +88.5% −3:1%
mean capital −11:7% +99.4% −1:9%
mean consumption −28:4% +4.5% −10:8%
mean e. labor −20:8% −24:8% −15:8%
bequests +35% +210% +75%
K/GDP 3.0 " 3.2 " 5.0 " 3.3
G / GDP 20.6% " 31:2% # 17:6% " 23:2%
Table 5: Comparing Steady States, in Partial or General Equilibrium, with or without
Medicare and Medicaid Expenditure Increase.
Role of Medicare and Medicaid Increases
The Social Security Administration calculates that a 2.2 percentage point increase
to the 12.4% OASDI payroll tax will restore the nancial balance in the social security
trust fund. According to Goss (1998), Deputy Chief Actuary of the Social Security Ad-
ministration, a 4.7% immediate increase of the existing OASDI payroll tax is necessary
to nance the existing social security system in perpetuity. The 1997 Economic Report
of the President argues that projected increases in medicare and medicaid expenditures
will contribute a heavier burden than nancing the social security system. In line with
the perspective of the 1997 Economic Report of the President, all of our calculations up
to now assume substantial increases in medicare and medicaid. Therefore, our computed
scal adjustments are designed to fund both higher social security and higher medicare
23and medicaid expenses. In this section, we brieﬂy describe two calculations designed to
shed light on how much of the scal burden comes from our having projected increases in
medicare and medicaid.
Thus, in our benchmark experiment 1 (which includes projected increases for med-
icaid and medicare expenditure), we computed that, in our general equilibrium setup, the
tax on labor income should increase from 29.7% to 59.5%. We now consider two other
experiments. Experiment 9 is a partial equilibrium version of experiment 1 where factor
prices are held xed at their values in the initial steady state and in which medicaid and
medicare expenditures do not increase over time. Experiment 10 has factor prices adjust-
ing to factor quantities, as in experiment 1, but keeps medicaid and medicare expenditures
constant over time. Both in experiments 9 and 10 the government gradually increases the
tax on labor income to nance its expenditures.
Table 5 compares outcomes across steady states (the initial steady state is common
to all experiments). The rst column reports the results for experiment 1, the second and
third columns describe the nal steady state for experiments 9 and 10.
Experiment 9 shows that to nance the increased burden of social security in this
environment, the tax rate on labor income should increase by 8.8 percentage points (from
29.7% to 38.5%). Even this partial equilibrium or `small open economy' environment
produces a large jump in the labor income tax rate, much larger than the 2.2% computed
by the SSA to balance the social security trust fund over the next 75 years and somewhat
larger than the 4.7% projected by Goss (1998). The main dierence with the computations
by Goss is probably the timing of the tax increases: Goss assumes that the OASDI payroll
tax is raised at once at the time of the computation (1996), while we assume that is is
raised in six steps, every ten years, staring from year 2000. The discrepancy with the
much lower 2.2% increase projected by the SSA to reestablish equilibrium of the social
security trust fun is obvioulsy due (besides the same assumption as Goss on the timing of
tax increases) to the fact that they only consider a 75 years horizon, starting from 1996.
Experiment 10 acknowledges the fact that the U.S. economy is a very large one,
and that changes in its economic scenario will aect the interest rate and the real wage. In
this environment, the tax rate on labor income increases by 17.1 percentage points (from
29.7% to 46.8%), reﬂecting the fact that the interest rate declines to 4.7% and the wage
increases by 5.8%. Not surprisingly, the decrease in labor supply is less than that in the
`small open economy' (−15:8% instead of −24:8%) and capital accumulation decreases by
almost 2%, instead of jumping up by 99%. The aging of the population and the increases
in the labor income tax to nance the social security system have very large eects.
The 1997 Economic Report of the President argues that nancing increased expen-
ditures on medicare and medicaid will have a much larger impact on the economy than
the scal burden due to maintaining the current unfunded social security system. A com-
parison of experiments 1 and 10 reveals, instead, that the distortions due to nancing our
unfunded social security system using a labor income tax will be large, given the SSA
forecasts about the aging of the poulation.
24Experiment 10, in which the distortions stem only from the necessity of nancing
the unfunded social security (no increase in government health expenditure here), shows
that the labor income tax rate has to be raised from 29.7% to 46.8% to maintain retirement
benets at current levelsand that average consumption and labor supply will eventually
decrease by 11% and 16%, respectively.
Not surprisingly, however, our results conrm that adding to this burden the pro-
jected increase in health expenditure will make the impact on the economy even heavier.
In experiment 1, in which the tax on labor income is raise to nance both our unfunded so-
cial security and the projected increase in government health expenditure, the tax on labor
income eventually raises to 59.5% and average consumption and labor supply respectively
decrease by 28% and 21% in the nal steady state.
Concluding Remarks
We have studied some implications of the SSA projected demographic dynamics un-
der alternative scal adjustments. Our setup allows for exogenous productivity growth and
the projected increase in medicare and medicaid spending. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst study to address the issue of the retirement of the baby boom generation
in a setting in which two important features for inducing private saving co-exist:
1. Life span uncertainty: This feature of the model induces the households in our
economy with no private annuity markets to save in order to insure against living
longer than expected. An increase in life expectancy, ceteris paribus, generates
higher private saving.
2. Life-long bequest motive: This motive not only helps us match the observed capital
output ratio but also makes the capital stock more resilient to dierent ways of
nancing the scal burden.
Our results indicate that the projected demographic transition will induce a tran-
sition to a new stationary equilibrium at which a large scal adjustment in the form of a
much higher labor income or consumption tax rate needs to be made. We nd that reduc-
ing benets (by taxing them or by postponing the normal retirement age) or imposing a
consumption tax will go far toward reducing the rise in the rate of taxation of labor that
will be required to sustain our unfunded social retirement system but will hurt some gen-
erations during the transition. An uncompensated phase-out of benets towards eventual
privatization delivers the largest welfare gains for future generations but at the same time
imposes the largest welfare costs on current and transitional generations. We also nd that
a simplication of the social security structure that makes clear the linkage between the
agent's past contributions and their future pensions, eliminates a labor/leisure distortion
and improves the welfare of all cohorts.
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27Appendix A: Preferences
For ease of exposition, we suppress the time subscript s, but it should be understood to
be present. A person's Bellman equations are:





tRtxt + EtVt+1 (xt+1)
)
where
EtVt+1 (xt+1)=t (s)Et (Vt+1 (xt+1)j alive) + (1 − t (s))Et (Vt+1 (xt+1)j dead)
Vt (xtj alive) = x0
tPtxt + t
Vt (xtj dead) = x0
tPT+1xt
x0
tPT+1xt = −JG((1 − b)at−1 − JB)
2
This last term captures the bequest motive. Here JG is a parameter governing the intensity
of the bequest motive and JB is an inheritance bliss point.
Riccati equations for Pt, Ft and t are:
Ft =( Qt + t (s)B0





tPt+1At +  (1 − t (s))B
0
tPT+1At)
Pt = Rt + F0
tQtFt + t (s)(At − BtFt)
0 Pt+1 (At − BtFt)
+  (1 − t (s))(At − BtFt)
0 PT+1 (At − BtFt)
t = t (s)(tr (Pt+1C0C)+t+1)+ (1 − t (s))trace PT+1C0C:
28Appendix B: Projected Demographics
Figure 1 is constructed by taking the projections of the conditional survival probabilities
from Bell, Wade and Goss (1992), and assuming a growth rate for entrant workers such
that we match the dependency ratio for 1975 and the forecasted one for 2040. The fore-
casted dependency ratio we match, is the `medium' projection given by the Social Security
Administration, under the current retirement age legislation. These are also the survival
probabilities and the new workers growth rate that we use in our experiments, in par-
ticular, the line corresponding to `current legislations' is the dependency ratio implied in
Experiments 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8; the one marked `current legislation +2', is the dependency
ratio in Experiments 3 and 4.
Starting from early 1900s, each successive cohort has faced successively more favorable
vectors of conditional survival probabilities as a result of improvements in exercise and
nutrition habits, medical techniques, environmental practices, etc., which have especially
become important by 1950s. Combined with a drastic increase in fertility in 1950s, the
demographic dynamics have created the anticipations of future increases in the dependency
ratio even before the time the baby boomers start to retire.
The Social Security Administration arrives at this gloomy picture of the future as fol-
lows. First, the SSA takes as its starting population for its projections the Social Security
Area as of January 1, 1989, and its breakdown by age, sex and marital status. Second, the
SSA projects future (a) fertility (taking into account historical trends, future use of birth
control methods, female participation in the labor force, divorce, etc.), (b) mortality (tak-
ing into account future development and applications of medical methods, environmental
pollutants, exercise and nutrition trends, drug use, etc.), (c) net immigration, (d) marriage,
and (5) divorce. The nal step is to compute projections for future survival probabilities,
fertility, immigration, marriage and divorce, after adjusting the above `primitive objects'
for a number of reasons. For example, instead of using `death rates', `death probabilities'
are computed as the ratio of the number of deaths occurring to a group in a given year to
the number of persons in this group at the beginning (as opposed to the middle) of the
year.
The outcome is a series of tables that show the Social Security Area population by
year, age, sex and marital status under three alternative projections (optimistic, medium,
pessimistic). Since we abstract from immigration, marriage, divorce, etc. in our model,
we approximate the time variation in the cohort shares and therefore the time path of the
dependency ratio by choosing a time path for the fertility rate fn(s)g which is ratio of
newly borns (model age 0 but real time age 21) at time s to those at time s−1; and using
the cohort-specic conditional survival probabilities given in Bell, Wade and Goss (1992).
29Appendix C: Changing the intensity of the bequest motive (JG)
To analyze the sensitivity of our results to the strength of the bequest motive, we
compare the results of experiment 1, calibrated as described in the paper, with its results
when either JG (the bequest motive intensity) or JG and  vary.
In the rst sensitivity check, we lower the value of JG by 10% (from .0320 to .0288).
In the second one, we decrease JG by 25% (from .0320 to .024) and increase  to obtain
the same capital to GDP ratio as in the initial steady state of experiment 1 ( increases
from .994 to .996). The latter parameter conguration is such that, should the consumer
live up to ninety years of age, she would die with few assets.
Columns 1 and 2 in table 5 refer to the initial and nal steady state of experiment 1 in
the original calibration; columns 3 and 4 to its initial and nal steady state with a lower
JG and columns 5 and 6 refer to its steady states when a much lower JG and a higher 
are assumed.
In our original calibration, the eective average discount factor of an individual over
her life{time (taking the mean of her  times her conditional survival probability) is .9679
in the initial steady state and .9838 in the nal one, reﬂecting the increase in the life{
expectancy. In the second sensitivity check we run, it is .9702 and .9859, respectively.
Contrasting columns 1 and 2 with columns 3 and 4 in table 5, we see that a 10% decrease
of JG does not change the results substantially. Labor supply stays the same both in the
initial and nal steady states. In the run with a lower JG, assets holdings and consumption
are slightly lower in both steady states. The interest rate and the tax rate on labor income
are a little bit higher. The capital to GDP ratio is also pretty much unchanged.
Comparison of the rst two columns with columns 5 and 6, it appears clear that, from
the aggregate point of view, considering an environment in which people care less about
leaving bequests but are more patient, does not change much the aggregates and even the
behavior of the economy over time. Not surprisingly, the variable most aected is the
amount of bequests in the economy.
We choose to adopt the model with a stronger bequest motive, rather than the one
with more patient agents, because on the age{asset accumulation prole, the model with
a stronger bequest motive is more consistent with the empirical evidence. In fact, in the
run with more patient agents and lower `altruism', people run down their assets faster in
the second part of their life, much faster then observed in the data. This is due to the fact
that their conditional survival probability is decreasing over time and the increase in their
joy{of{giving, should they die, is lower. Moreover, we feel that the calibration we adopt
in the paper is consistent with Kotliko and Summers' ndings on the proportion of the
present value of wealth which is transmitted from one generation to the next.
30Steady State 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variable
` 29.66% 59.48% 29.81% 61.19% 29.66% 59.92%
interest rate 5.93% 5.01% 6.02% 5.17% 5.92% 5.17%
wage 3.18 3.31 3.17 3.29 3.18 3.29
GDP 12.11 10.00 12.06 9.87 12.13 9.94
mean asset holdings 41.55 36.35 41.08 35.42 41.62 35.68
mean capital 36.00 31.77 35.53 30.87 36.07 31.13
mean consumption 6.67 4.77 6.65 4.70 6.68 4.76
mean e. labor 2.55 2.02 2.55 2.01 2.56 2.02
bequests 18.75 25.32 17.83 21.46 16.65 16.66
K/GDP 2.97 3.17 2.95 3.13 2.97 3.13
G / GDP .20 .31 .20 .31 .20 .31
Table 6: Steady States Comparisons.
Appendix D: Figures
















Figure 3: Age-labor supply proles in steady states; 0 denotes the initial
steady state.
















Figure 4: Age-labor supply proles in alternative steady states; 0 denotes the
initial steady state.














Figure 5: Cross section age-asset holding proles in alternative steady states.















Figure 6: Cross section age-asset holding proles in steady states.














Figure 7: Cross section age{consumption proles in steady states.














Figure 8: Cross section age{consumption proles in steady states.

















Figure 9: Life cycle consumption proles in steady states.

















Figure 10: Life cycle consumption proles in steady states.









Labor Tax Rate over Time
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Figure 11: Labor tax rate ` during transitions.














Figure 12: Consumption tax rate c during transitions.













Figure 13: Interest rate during transitions.














Figure 14: Interest rate during transitions.












Figure 15: Average consumption during transitions.













Figure 16: Average consumption during transitions.















Figure 17: Average labor supply during transition, in eciency units.
















Figure 18: Average labor supply during transition, in eciency units.


















Figure 19: Average capital holdings during transitions.


















Figure 20: Average capital holdings during transitions.
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